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Co-Ownership Discounts: Fifth Circuit Says 
IRS Position Not “Substantially Justified”

-by Neil E. Harl* 
Until 1989, the Tax Court had rejected co-ownership or “fractionalization” 
discounts to real property values1 although interests in real estate held as community 
property had been eligible for discount for non-marketability of the decedent’s fractional 
interest.2 However, a 1989 case, Estate of Youle v. Commissioner,3 allowed a discount of 
12 ½ percent for tenancy in common ownership. That case has been followed by about 20 
cases allowing discounts of 10 to 60 percent.4 For real property other than timberland, a 
discount of 20 percent has been considered as relatively safe.5 
The IRS position 
Throughout the 25 years during which the co-ownership discount has been 
litigated, the Internal Revenue Service has never waivered from its position that any 
discount should be limited to the costs of partitioning the property.6 The Service position 
has been that the issue of a discount was a question of fact. 
The latest chapter 
In the latest round of developments in the long-running saga of co-ownership 
discounts, the Internal Revenue Service position that co-ownership discounts should be 
limited to the costs of partitioning the property was dealt a serious blow by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals7 which found that the Internal Revenue Service had failed to meet its 
burden of proving that its position on co-ownership or fractionalization discounts “was 
substantially justified.”8 The court decision thus cleared the way for litigation costs to be 
charged to IRS although the case was remanded to the Tax Court to determine if the estate’s 
claim for attorneys’ fees was unreasonable.9 
The case had involved a long-running dispute between the estate and IRS over discounts. 
The estate had argued initially for a discount of 25 percent on 16 non-contiguous tracts 
of timberland in Louisiana.10 The IRS countered that any discount should be limited to 
the costs of partitioning the property.11 In the process of negotiating with the Service, the 
estate ratcheted the discount claim up from 25 percent to 50 percent, later from 50 to 60 
percent and finally from 60 to 90 percent.12 
The Tax Court approved a 55 percent discount for the non-controlling interests and an 
additional five percent discount because of the “peculiar circumstances with respect to 
the decedent’s remaining family members.”13 That apparently was with reference to the 
estate’s assertion that any partition would be “. . . vigorously resisted by the remaining _ 
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co-owners.”14 But the Tax Court rejected a claim for litigation 
costs and found the IRS position was substantially justified. 
As is well known, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is 
known to provide a friendly forum to taxpayers. The question, 
notwithstanding that fact, is whether the decision in Baird v. 
Commissioner15 will lead to a relaxation in the IRS position on 
co-ownership discounts. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Estate of Pudim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1982-606; Estate of 
Clapp v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1983-721; Estate of McMullen 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-500 (value of decedent’s one-
half interest in trust property not discounted as fractional share 
when trust property to be sold as entire fee simple property 
interests). 
2 Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982). 
But see Estate of Haydel v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-507 
(no discount allowed where pre-trial stipulation set values of 
property interests). 
3 T.C. Memo. 1989-138. 
4 See, e.g., Estate of Cervin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-
550, rev’d on another issue, 111 F.3d 1252 (5th Cir. 1997) (20 
percent discount allowed for 50 percent interest in farm and 
homestead); Estate of Pillsbury v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-
425 (15 percent discount allowed for undivided 77 percent and 50 
percent interests in real estate); Estate of Baird v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2001-258, (60 percent fractional share discount allowed 
for timber property in trust). See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 43.02[2] (2005); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
5.02[1] (2005). See also Harl, “Co-Ownership Discounts: A
New Direction?” 11 Agric. L. Dig. 25 (2000). 
5 See, e.g., Estate of Brocato v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-
424 (20 percent fractional share discount allowed for apartment 
houses; IRS had argued cost of partitioning as limit to discount). 
Compare Estate of Busch v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-3 (10 
percent discount for co-ownership of agricultural land for federal 
estate tax purposes allowed which was “more than adequate” to 
cover reasonable costs of partition action; estate had claimed 40 
percent discount; all heirs seemingly interested in development 
of land on edge of city). See Harl, “Co-Ownership Discounts: A
New Direction?” 11 Agric. L. Dig. 25 (2000), where the author 
opined that the discount represented “an attentiveness to the 
costs of partitioning beyond that found in earlier cases.” 11 
Agric. L. Dig. 25, 26. In Estate of Busch, the estate had sought 
a 40 percent discount for co-ownership of a 90.74 acre tract 
of land on the outskirts of Pleasanton, California. The Court 
rejected the IRS argument that the owners were trying to sell 
the property and so no discount should be allowed. The land 
had been owned by the 98 year-old decedent and a trust for the 
97 year-old surviving spouse of a deceased brother. 
6 See Ltr. Rul. 199336002, May 28, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 199943003, 
June 7, 1999. 
7 Estate of Baird v. Comm’r, 2005-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
60,505 (5th Cir. 2005). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15  2005-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶  60,505 (5th Cir. 2005). 
SETTLEmENT REACHED IN 
SmITHFIELD FOODS CASE 
By Roger A. McEowen
The Iowa Attorney General’s Office and Smithfield Foods, Inc., 
including all of its related entities and Murphy Family Farms, 
L.L.C., and Prestage Stoecker Farms, Inc., its successors, agents 
and assigns etc… (hereinafter “Smithfield”) have agreed to a 
settlement of the constitutional challenge initiated by Smithfield 
in Federal District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in April, 
2002, Civil No. 4-02-CV-90324-RP-TJS. See also Smithfield 
Foods, Inc. et al. v. Miller, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10051 (8th 
Cir. May 21, 2004), vac’g and rem’g, 241 F. Supp.2d 978 (S.D. 
Ia. 2003). See also McEowen & Harl, “Iowa Ban on Packer 
Ownership of Livestock Ruled Unconstitutional,” 14 Agric. L. Dig. 
17 (2003). This document sets out the major terms of settlement 
agreement executed between the parties. The entire text of the 
Agreement will be available on the Iowa Attorney General’s web-
site: iowaattorneygeneral.org. The major terms of the Settlement 
Agreement are as follows:
Producer Rights. Smithfield has agreed that its Iowa producers 
shall have a set of identified producer rights, which include, but are 
not limited to the following: (1) right to Join an Association; (2) 
right to be a “whistleblower;” (3) right to use a contract producer 
lien (Iowa Code §§ 579A, 579B; (4) right to review contracts 
pursuant to Iowa Code § 202.3; and (5) right to disclose contract
terms pursuant to Iowa Code § 202.3
Remedies. Smithfield has agreed that should any Iowa producer 
suffer damages as a result of a Smithfield’s breach of their contract 
with the Iowa producer or as a result of Smithfield’s failure to 
provide abide by any of the other provisions of the Settlement 
Agreement, the Iowa producer, as third party beneficiaries of 
the Settlement Agreement, can bring a civil action for damages, 
including treble and punitive damages. In addition, if the Iowa 
producer prevails in the above-referenced civil action, Smithfield
will be responsible for the producer’s costs and attorney fees in 
addition to any awarded damages.
Prohibited Company Activities. Smithfield has agreed to 
refrain from a list of activities that include, but are not limited to 
the following: (1) taking actions to coerce, intimidate, retaliate 
against, or discriminate against producers that exercise or attempt 
to exercise their rights under the Settlement Agreement, including 
actions affecting the following: (a) execution, termination, 
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extension, or renewal of an agricultural contract; (b) alter the 
quality, and/or quantity of delivery times of contract inputs; (c) 
use the performance of any other contract grower as the basis of 
the termination, cancellation, or renewal of a production contract 
or to negatively affect the grower’s compensation; or (d) require 
contract producers to make a capital investment in addition to the 
capital investment required by the Iowa producer’s production
contract with Smithfield, unless fair and equitable compensation 
is paid to the producer in a manner the producer agrees to in 
writing.
Iowa Producer’s Ability to Organize. Smithfield has agreed 
that if its Iowa producers organize or adopt a collective bargaining 
unit, Smithfield will not retaliate against such growers. In addition, 
Smithfield will refrain from any anti-trust or restraint-of-trade
litigation against such growers and Smithfield agrees to negotiate 
in good faith with any such grower organization.
Environmental Program. Smithfield has agreed to fund 
and participate in an environmental program at Iowa State 
University that will train Smithfield’s Iowa Producer’s in the best 
environmental practices. Funding levels are set at $ 100,000.00/ 
year. 
Smithfield/Lueter Scholarship Fund at Iowa State University.
Smithfield has agreed to continue to fund the above-referenced 
scholarship program for an additional four years at $60,000.00/ 
year.
Iowa Plants. Smithfield has agreed that it has every intention 
to keep its Iowa plants and its plant in Sioux Falls, south Dakota in 
operation. Should said intentions change, Smithfield will provide 
90 days notice to the Iowa Attorney General’s Office.
market Access. Smithfield has agreed that for two years 
following the execution of this agreement 25 percent of the swine 
slaughtered at its Iowa facilities and in its plant in Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota will be purchased from non-Smithfield sellers. The 
Iowa Attorney General’s Office has agreed that, given Smithfield’s 
compliance with the terms of this Settlement Agreement, it 
will not pursue enforcement of Iowa Code § 202B.201 against 
Smithfield. The parties to the Settlement agreement have agreed 
that the agreement shall be in effect for 10 years from the date of 
execution. 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANkRUPtcy 
GENERAL 
DISCHARGE. The debtor had a contract with a creditor to 
purchase weener pigs at monthly intervals. Two of the batches of 
pigs were infected with a virus and the debtor withheld payment 
of two subsequent batches in order to force the creditor to discuss 
the infected batches. The parties failed to agree on liability and the 
creditor filed suit for payment.An arbitrator ruled in the creditor’s 
favor and the debtor filed for bankruptcy before the creditor could 
obtain a judgment on the arbitrator’s decision. The creditor sought 
to have the arbitrator’s award declared nondischargeable under 
Section 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury by the creditor 
of a creditor’s interest. The creditor alleged that the debtor acted 
with fraudulent intent when the debtor accepted the second two 
batches with the intent not to pay for them. The court held that 
the debtor did not have the intent to defraud the creditor but 
was merely seeking a method of negotiating a settlement for the 
infected pigs. The court found that the parties did not engage in 
a series of separate purchases but had a long term, multi-delivery 
contract over which the debtor had made the required payments. 
Gehl v. Land O’Lakes Feed, LLC, 325 B.R. 269 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 2005). 
EXEmPTIONS. 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The Chapter 7 debtor claimed an 
exemption as household goods, under Section 523(d)(3), for a 
shotgun, pistol, rifles, and fishing equipment. The court rejected 
the test that firearms were per se not household goods. The court 
adopted the “functional-nexus” analysis for determining the nature 
of property in the hands of the debtor. Under this test, household 
goods included personal property used to support and facilitate 
daily life in the residence. Under this standard, the court held that 
the burden was on the objecting creditor to provide evidence that 
the claimed exempt property was not used by the debtor for daily
life in the residence; therefore, the exemptions were allowed. In 
re Andershonis, 324 B.R. 247 (Bankr. m.D. Penn. 2005). 
FEDERAL TAX 
AUtOMAtIc StAy. The Chapter 13 debtor listed an unsecured 
priority claim for federal taxes and provided for payment of the 
taxes in the confirmed plan. The IRS filed a motion for relief 
from the automatic stay in order to offset a portion of its claim by 
retaining a tax refund due to the debtor. The court held that the IRS 
was not entitled to relief from the automatic stay merely because 
it had a right of setoff of the tax refund, but that relief required 
some proof of a cause which furthered the purposes of bankruptcy. 
Because the IRS provided no cause for relief from the automatic 
stay except its right of setoff, the court held that no relief would 
be granted in that the requested relief would put the IRS in a better 
position than other similar claims in the Chapter 13 plan. In re 
Shultz, 325 B.R. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). 
DISCHARGE. The debtor sought a ruling that taxes due more 
than six years before the filing of the Chapter 7 petition were 
dischargeable. The court granted dismissal for the IRS for failure of 
the debtor to state a claim for which relief may be granted, because 
the debtor failed to provide any allegations of material elements 
of a cause of action. In re Rowe, 2005-2 U.S. tax cas. (ccH) 
¶ 50,551 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). 
